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Abstract 
The current supply of deceased donor organs is insufficient to meet the growing demand for 
transplantable organs. Consequently, candidates for kidney transplantation are encouraged to find a living donor. 
In 2008 the Department of Health and Human Services began to reimburse donor’s travel-related expenses via the 
National Living Donor Assistance Center (NLDAC). Using variation in transplant centers’ applications for donor 
assistance, we use a difference-in-difference model to estimate the relationship between NLDAC and living donor 
kidney transplants. We find that among participating transplant centers the program increased the number of 
living donor kidney transplants by approximately 14%. 
Keywords: Transplantation, Living Donors, Financial Incentives 
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1 Introduction 
There are over 615 thousand patients with End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) in the United States (USRDS 
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2013). The costs of treating these patients accounts for over $40 billion in annual treatment costs (NKUDIC 2014). 
Most of these patients are treated with dialysis, but patient outcomes improve and the costs are lower for 
patients who receive a kidney transplant. Currently, there are not enough kidneys recovered from deceased 
donors to satisfy the demand for organs and many patients are encouraged to seek a living donor kidney 
transplant. In 2012 deceased donors provided 10,868 organs and 5,619 patients received kidneys from living 
donors (OPTN 2014). However, during this same time period 30,274 patients were added to the waiting list that 
already included 88,874 patients at the beginning of the year and 11,012 patients either died while waiting for an 
organ or were removed due to poor health (OPTN 2014). Clearly, the current organ procurement and allocation 
mechanisms are not sufficient to meet the growing demand for transplantable organs. 
Though ethical considerations have prevented direct monetary incentives to donors, there is a growing 
concern that the costs of being a living donor may be acting as a disincentive and preventing donations (Fisher et 
al. 2015; Delmonico et al. 2015). While the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) prohibits payments that provide 
incentives for donation, it does not preclude payments to donors to cover the costs associated with donating. 
These costs, which include travel to and from a transplant center, may discourage potential living donors from 
agreeing to donate an organ. In 2004 Congress authorized the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to 
create a program to reduce the financial disincentives associated with living organ donation by covering low 
income living donors’ non-medical transplant-related costs (e.g., travel and incidental expenses). In 2008 the 
Federally-funded National Living Donor Assistance Center (NLDAC) began to pay donation-related expenses for 
qualified living donors. Using variation in transplant centers’ applications for donor assistance, we estimate the 
impact of NLDAC on the number of living organ donors. We find that the program led to a 14% increase in the 
number of living organ donors at participating centers providing an annual benefit to society of approximately 
$252 million. 
Our analysis is complicated by the fact that a center’s application for donor assistance is not exogenous 
and therefore it is difficult to claim that the NLDAC program caused the observed increase in living organ donors. 
A center’s ability to file for donor assistance at any time introduces a potential reverse causality. In our analysis we 




explore a number of different empirical specifications to minimize the impacts of reverse causality and to 
investigate the sensitivity of our results to alternative structural assumptions. Our results are robust to these 
alternative specifications and the falsification tests we utilize further support our findings. This said, we can not 
make any claims about what would happen if a non-enrolled center decided to start filing for donor assistance 
with NLDAC. However, finding a positive association between NLDAC and living organ kidney donation is an 
important finding that will contribute to our growing understanding of individual incentives within our current 
organ transplant market. 
The economics literature has naturally focused on prohibitions against paying donors, living or deceased, 
as the principal cause of the shortage of transplantable organs (Cohen 1989; Adams et al. 1999; Becker and Elias 
2007; Cohen 1989; Kaserman and Barnett 2002; Welington and Whitmire 2007). While there is a growing support 
for the use of donor incentives in the transplant community (Peters 1991; Gaston et al. 2006; Howard (RJ) 2007), 
provision of any type of “valuable consideration” violates NOTA and many transplant professionals, clergy, and 
even patients continue to find payment for donation “repugnant” (Roth 2007).1 However, because the NLDAC 
program focuses on covering donation related expenses it does not violate NOTA. Therefore, NLDAC provides a 
step toward reducing the financial disincentives associated with being a living organ donor. 
Aside from the NLDAC program there are other incentive structures that provide limited financial support 
for living organ donation. A number of U.S. states permit organ and bone marrow donors to claim tax credits or 
deductions for donation-related expenses and grant paid leave for organ donors (National Kidney Foundation 
                                                            
 
1 The primary reason for opposing a direct market for organs within the transplant community is based on ethical 
considerations (Pellegrino 1991; Delmonico et al. 2002; Israni et al. 2004; Steinbrook 2005; Rothman 2002). 




2013).2 The current literature has found that these programs have not increased the rate of living organ donation 
(Boulware et al. 2008; Lacetera et al. 2014; Venkataramani et al. 2012; Wellington and Sayre 2011). However, the 
research of Lacetera et al. (2014) has illustrated that these programs have successfully increased the rate of bone 
marrow donation. They argue that the tax and leave benefits provide a large enough financial benefit to 
compensate for the less medically intrusive bone marrow donation procedures, but not enough to increase living 
organ donation, which requires a major surgical procedure. 
One concern about paying donors is that the extrinsic incentives will crowd out the intrinsic motivation 
and prosocial behavior (Rothman and Rothman 2006; Danovitch and Leichtman 2006), possibly leading to a net 
reduction in the supply of organs. However, this concern is not applicable in our environment as the NLDAC is 
targeted at reducing the costs of being a donor versus providing a reward. Furthermore, recent empirical research 
on the use of financial incentives to increase blood donations, which also relies on the altruistic motives of the 
donor, have not found results consistent with the crowding out hypothesis (Lacetera et al. 2012, 2013; Lacetera 
and Macis 2013). Instead this literature has illustrated a strong correlation between financial incentives and the 
rate of blood donation.3 Additionally, recent research conducted by Ferguson (2013, 2015) has focused more 
directly on the type of altruism blood donors possess and found that they are either warm-glow giviers (Andreoni 
1990) or are reluctant altruists in that their cooperation rates are high when free-riding is also high (Ferguson 
2013, 2015). Ferguson argues that both of these types of individuals will most likely increase donations if a 
                                                            
 
2 These incentive programs are consistent with the growing support in the transplant community to make sure 
that the donor is left no worse off then they were prior to electing to be a donor (Boulware et al. 2006; Israni et al. 
2004; Fox 2006; Gaston et al. 2006). 
3 The crowding out hypothesis has been theoretically studied in the living organ market by Epstein (2008) and the 
deceased donor market by Byrne and Thompson (2001). 




financial incentive is provided via a charitable instrument versus direct financial compensation. By compensating 
organ donors for costs related to donation, but not leaving them better off than if they had not donated, NLDAC 
should not lead to crowd out. 
Although direct financial compensation remains off the table, some countries, including the U.S., are 
experimenting with market-like mechanisms for increasing the supply of living organ donors.4 Based in part on 
the work of Roth and colleagues (Roth et al. 2004, 2005, 2007), the U.S. Organ Procurement and Transplantation 
Network recently implemented the Kidney Paired Donation Pilot Program.5 The program permits kidney 
transplant candidates with immunological-incompatible living donors to swap donors. In the absence of the 
program, the candidates would have to undergo more risky incompatible transplants or join the waiting list for a 
deceased donor organ. Changes in the organ allocation rules have also been enacted in an effort to increase organ 
donation. For instance, in 2008 the Israeli Parliament passed a law that gives priority on the deceased donor 
transplant waiting list to persons who have registered to become organ donors themselves. Early evidence 
indicates that donation rates increased after the law went into effect (Lavee and Brock 2012).6 
                                                            
 
4 For a more detailed discussion of the public policy debate see Howard (DH) (2007) who provides a summary of 
the pros and cons of different public policies that could be utilized to increase organ donation: financial incentives 
for deceased donors, presumed consent, mutual insurance pools and payment for living donors. 
5 Ross et al. (1997) conducted a detailed analysis of the ethics of a paired-kidney exchange and they concluded 
that it did not violate the “valuable consideration” clause of NOTA and that it satisfied the current ethical 
standards within the transplant community. NOTA was subsequently amended in 2007 to permit paired-kidney 
donations. 
6 The efficacy of the different public policies that could be utilized to incentivize deceased donor organs, changes 




The following section discusses the transplantation environment in more detail. Section Three discusses 
the NLDAC program, focusing on the nature of the financial incentives offered and on program eligibility. In 
Section Four we discuss the data used to investigate the association between NLDAC and living donor kidney 
transplants. Section Five outlines the difference-in-difference model estimated and Section Six illustrates two 
falsification tests used to further validate our results. The final section summarizes our results and provides some 
additional avenues for fruitful research on increasing organ donation. 
2 Transplantation Environment 
Patients suffering from ESRD can obtain organs from either a deceased or living organ donor. The 
mechanisms for obtaining these two types of organs are different. The deceased donor market is determined by 
the available supply of deceased donors. Upon death a deceased’s next-of-kin are contacted to determine 
whether or not they are willing to donate the deceased’s organs. If they agree, or if the decedent has a 
documented antemortem expression of first-person donation consent, the organs are offered to the local Organ 
Procurement Organization (OPO) which initiates a match run. The match run orders patients on the waiting list 
according to a prespecified algorithm. Offers are made from this list to transplant teams, who elect to accept or 
decline the organ offer for their patient based on medical criteria. The sequence of offers is determined by a 
point-based system that is heavily influenced by the length of time that each patient has been waiting for an 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
in the priority rule as well as the default donation decision, have also been experimental investigated (Kessler and 
Roth 2012; Li et al. 2013). The central findings of this research are that utilizing a priority rule will increase organ 
donation (Kessler and Roth 2012) and changing the default donation policy from an opt-in to an opt-out program 
would also increase organ donation (Li et al. 2013). There is also a growing literature on the impact that public 
policies have on organ donation rates, such as presumed consent laws (Beard et al. 2004), the repeal of helmet 
laws (Dikert-Conlin et al. 2011) and the current loopholes in priority rule regulations (Kessler and Roth 2013). 





The living donor system is substantially different from the deceased donor system because the patient 
actively searches for a potential volunteer donor to be screened by the transplant team to determine their 
medical, surgical, and psychosocial suitability. If the living donor is deemed suitable, the transplant process goes 
forward. In the case that a potential living donor is not suitable the National Kidney Registry facilitates a process 
that matches a patient with other potential donors in an effort to conduct two-way and three-way exchanges, 
sometimes longer chains, to more efficiently utilize the available living donor organ pool (Roth et al. 2004, 2005, 
2007). Although economists have argued that the costs of seeking a living donor match are very low and warrant 
an increase in effort to increase this pool of donors (Thorne 1996), there is still a reluctance among those in need 
to request organs from others. Presumably, this is a result of large non-financial costs associated with seeking a 
living organ donation.8 
The number of deceased and living kidney donors as well as transplants conducted between 1988 and 
2012 are illustrated in Figure 1. The total number of kidney donors has increased substantially since 1988, with a 
total increase of approximately 129%. However, the rate of growth over the past decade has stalled. The rate of 
increase in the living donor pool far outpaced the deceased donor pool until the early 2000s. The number of 
                                                            
 
7 A primary exception to this rule is if the patient-donor histocompatibilties possess a zero antigen mismatch, 
which implies that an organ is a near perfect fit for the patient with an extremely low probability of rejection. If 
this is the case a patient on the waiting list with a zero antigen mismatch will be given priority over others. 
8 More recently Howard (2011) has argued that there are large non-financial costs associated with eliciting a 
donor. He illustrated that the waiting time for an organ functions as a price for deceased donor organs for patients 
waiting for a transplant. 




deceased donors increased by 91% between 1988 and 2012, whereas the increase in living donors was 209% 
(OPTN 2014). The number of transplants conducted clearly illustrates that deceased donor transplants are more 
prevalent than living organ donor transplants. This is because each deceased donor results in an average of 1.55 
deceased donor transplants, as both of their kidneys are often recovered for transplantation, and by definition a 
living organ donor only provides one organ for transplantation. This ratio has decreased substantially from 1.82 in 
1988 to 1.46 transplants per a donor in 2012 (OPTN 2014). In 2012, 10,868 deceased donor kidney transplants 
were conducted from 7,421 deceased donors and 5,619 living donor kidney transplants conducted (OPTN 2014). 
Living organ donors may incur substantial travel expenses as part of the donation process. Candidate 
donors must travel to the transplant center to be evaluated and return for surgery and post-surgical follow-up 
visits if they are eligible to donate. Many travel with a relative or friend for support and assistance, adding to the 
cost. Even when donors live in the same city as their recipient, they may need to travel if nearby hospitals do not 
offer transplant services, if the recipient prefers an out-of-town center, or if the recipient’s insurer restricts 
coverage to procedures performed in out-of-town facilities. Recipients are allowed to reimburse donors for 
expenses, and some hospitals provide low cost lodging options. However, most donors pay some or all of their 
travel costs out-of- pocket (McCune et al. 2004). These costs present a substantial hardship to many donors 
(Shover et al. 1997) and may discourage individuals from donating in the first place. 
3 NLDAC Program 
The Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act (ODRIA) of 2004 (U.S.C. 274f) authorized the 
Department of Health and Human Services to establish a program to reimburse travel-related and other incidental 
expenses of living donors and persons undergoing evaluation for living donation. The program, named the 
National Living Donor Assistance Center (NLDAC), is operated jointly by the University of Michigan and the 
American Society of Transplant Surgeons under a cooperative agreement with the Health Resources and Services 
Administration. Transplant centers could enroll in the NLDAC program starting in October 2007, and financial 
assistance was initiated in January 2008. The NLDAC program is a means-tested program. Qualifying donors must 
have an income below 300% of the federal poverty level. NLDAC grants exceptions if donors can demonstrate 




financial hardship. NLDAC provides reimbursement for donation-related travel and incidental expenses up to 
$6,000. NLDAC does not compensate donors for lost wages or out-of-pocket medical expenses. 
The number of applications to NLDAC has been increasing each year since its inception. NLDAC received 
over 900 applications in the 2013 fiscal year and the number of donors receiving assistance increased from 164 in 
2008 to 426 in 2012. Of the 3,918 applications received from fiscal years 2008 through the end of fiscal year 2013, 
148 were not approved, 221 were withdrawn, and 38 missed the submission deadline. 1,133 applicants were 
approved for funding but were ineligible to donate.9 At the end of the fiscal year in 2013 donation surgery was 
pending for 443 applicants. The total outlay of funds in the fiscal year 2013 was $1.8 million and the median 
income of aid beneficiaries was approximately $34,000. Fifty-seven percent of NLDAC applicants were employed 
full time. The approved donors received an average of $2,800 in assistance. 
Potential donors cannot apply directly to NLDAC. Instead, they apply through transplant centers that have 
registered with NLDAC. The first step in the process requires centers to enroll in the program and register with 
NLDAC. The first month that a center could enroll was in October 2007. In order to increase enrollment, the 
NLDAC staff promoted the program to transplant center staff (i.e.,transplant coordinators, social workers, 
physicians) at various professional meetings. Following enrollment a center could elect to participate in the 
program by submitting an application with NLDAC for donor assistance. Participation could vary across years as 
some centers may elect to submit applications in one year and not in another. Therefore, participation can be 
defined based on whether or not they participated in the past or are an active participant in the program (i.e., 
filed with NLDAC in the current year). This said, enrollment and participation are not exogenous and efforts must 
be taken to account for potential selection effects into the program. 
                                                            
 
9 Potential donors undergo a rigorous screening process. Persons with hypertension, diabetes, mental health 
problems, or other chronic conditions cannot donate organs. 




Figure 2 illustrates the enrollment and participation rates. Enrollment is defined as when a center 
registered with the NLDAC and centers rapidly enrolled in the program. Enrollment, defined as ,it enrolledNLDAC , 
exceeded 87% of all U.S. living donor transplant programs within six months. At the end of 2012 enrollment was 
approximately 94%.10 If we define participation as beginning when a center filed their first application with 
NLDAC, defined as ,it filedNLDAC , participation rates are substantially lower than enrollment levels. In the first 
year of the program approximately 46% of the centers participated in the program and the percentage increased 
to slightly over 80% by the end of the data period. If we define participation year by year, (by including a center as 
participating in a given year only if one or more applications were filed within that given year), defined as 
,it activeNLDAC , results in an even lower participation rate, reaching a maximum of approximately 63% by the end 
of our data period. 
Centers that enroll in NLDAC have greater transplant volume than non-enrolling centers and they may 
differ along unobserved dimensions as well. Furthermore, centers that enroll may have a greater capacity to 
benefit from the NLDAC program. Enrolled centers account for 99% of the total living donor transplants observed 
in our data set. In most program evaluation studies researchers are trying to extrapolate results from a small 
number of treated units to a much larger group of units that are potentially eligible for treatment. Selection into 
treatment is problematic, even if researchers observe pre-program outcomes in the treated units. In our case, the 
goal of the analysis is simply to estimate the relationship between NLDAC and the volume of living donor 
transplants among participating centers. We make no claims about what would happen if a non-enrolled center 
decided to start filing claims. We include non-enrolled centers in the study to control for factors common to all 
                                                            
 
10 In calculating the percentage of enrolled centers we only look at those centers that have a positive number of 
patients on their kidney waiting list. 




centers that affected trends in the volume of living organ donors. A finding that NLDAC is positively associated 
with transplant volume among enrolled centers would be an important finding even if enrollment in NLDAC would 
have no effect on centers that did not enroll. Our identification strategy discussed in the empirical modeling 
section outlines the methods we use to mitigate this selection effect. 
One other aspect of the transplant environment that must be accounted for in our analysis is the 
regulatory status of the transplant center. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) monitor the 
performance of each transplant center under their Conditions of Participation (CoP) standards that took effect on 
June 28, 2007, shortly before NLDAC was launched. The CoP measures use each center’s one-year graft and 
patient survival statistics to determine whether the center is performing adequately. Therefore, these regulatory 
standards may also alter a center’s volume of living organ transplantation.11 
4 Data Description 
The data for our analysis come from three separate sources. From the Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network (OPTN) we obtained information on all the patients waiting for a kidney transplant and 
the donors who provided organs between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2012. We merged this data with 
NLDAC records on the volume of filings by year and center as well as the date that the transplant center enrolled 
in NLDAC. We obtained data on a centers’ regulatory status (meeting versus not meeting CMS standards) from the 
Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR). Our analysis focuses on 239 unique transplant centers that 
                                                            
 
11 Details regarding the information used by the CMS CoP to determine a center’s regulatory status are contained 
in Abecassis et al. (2008) and Dickinson et al. (2006, 2008). Additional details, and the behavioral impacts of the 
CMS CoP are contained in Schnier et al. (2013a, 2013b), Ouayogode (2014) and Cox et al. (2012). 




performed non-pediatric living donor kidney transplants between 2003 and 2012.12 There were 28,680 
observations at the transplant center-month level. We further restricted our sample to only those center-month 
observations where the center had a non-zero number of patients currently waiting for a kidney transplant at the 
center to ensure that we focused on only those centers that were actively conducting kidney transplants during 
this time period. This restriction resulted in a data set containing 26,749 center-month observations.13 
In the following discussion we compare trends in the number of living donor transplants conducted 
between enrolled, filing and non-filing centers, all defined various ways, to compare pre-NLDAC trends in 
transplant volume and to look for graphical evidence of a NLDAC treatment effect. To illustrate the structural 
differences between centers that did and did not participate we regressed the number of living donor transplants 
conducted each month on a set of center-level fixed effects to de-mean the data and plotted the resulting 
residuals two different ways. To illustrate the differences at the monthly level we plot the average residual for our 
defined treatment and control group over the time horizon of the data. Our alternative plot aggregates the 
residuals up to the annual level to provide a more smoothed illustration of the structural differences. The residual 
plots allow for us to graphically illustrate the differences between our treatment and control groups, while 
controlling for center-level heterogeneity (i.e., level effects). This helps to provide initial evidence of the 
relationship between NLDAC and living organ donation. One factor common among all of the figures illustrated is 
that they trend downwards because during our time period studied the number of living donor transplants fell 
from 6,470 to 5,619, see Figure 1 (UNOS 2014). 
Figure 3 contains the average residual plots for those centers that elected to enroll in the NLDAC program 
                                                            
 
12 A pediatric center is defined as a center that specializes in and conducts only pediatric kidney transplants. 
13 Our preliminary analysis indicated that our estimates were robust to the exclusion of these observations. 




and those that did not enroll in the program. The residual plots illustrate that prior to the NLDAC program being 
initiated those centers who enrolled and did not enroll in NLDAC possessed similar downward trends. However, 
following the creation of the NLDAC those centers that enrolled in the program deviated substantially from this 
trend in the initial years following enrollment. There are a number of reasons why centers differed in their 
tendency to enroll and their level of participation conditional on enrollment. NLDAC staff attended transplant 
conferences and distributed promotional materials to encourage enrollment, but the intensity of contact varied 
across centers. Centers with more to gain from the program (i.e., large centers) may have been among the first to 
enroll. Furthermore, NLDAC tried to keep the eligibility criteria and verification process as simple as possible while 
complying with the requirements of the authorizing legislation. However, participation required training to 
understand how to complete application forms, compile the relevant documentation, and instruct patients about 
the reimbursement process. This was a learning process that may have influenced why a center elected to 
participate or not at a given point in time. Another factor that may have influenced participation is variation in the 
transplant center’s staff experience levels and internal turnover. It is for these reasons that we need to be careful 
how we define “participation” in our model. 
Expanding our definition of our treatment and comparison groups, we further partition the data by 
focusing on only those centers that enrolled in NLDAC and elected to either file a claim at some point in time 
following enrollment (i.e., participated in the NLDAC program) or did not elect to file a claim at any point in time 
during our study. These are both time invariant groupings that define participation as any activity in the 
post-NLDAC time period. The plot of the mean monthly and year residuals for these two groups is contained in 
Figure 4. Although our definition of treatment and comparison group has changed, we observe a similar pattern to 
that observed in Figure 3. In the pre-NLDAC period those centers who enrolled and filed at least once with NLDAC 
in the post-NLDAC period and those centers who enrolled but never filed a claim with NLDAC illustrate a similar 
downward data trend. Furthermore, we again observe the treatment effect among those centers that enrolled 
and filed with NLDAC in the years immediately following the creation of the NDLAC. However, the magnitude of 
this treatment effect is smaller than that observed in Figure 3, which would be expected given that we are an 
essence purging a sizable proportion of the effect associated with enrolling with the NLDAC. 




We can not differentiate the pre-NLDAC trends for centers that enrolled and filed at least once with 
NLDAC from centers that actively filed with NLDAC in a given year because the later group is subset of the former 
group. However, we can differentiate the post-NLDAC trends between these two respective groups and the 
residual plots are contained in Figure 5. The trends in the data provide our most concrete illustration of the 
treatment effects generated by the NLDAC. The pre-NLDAC trends are identical to those observed in Figure 4 as 
the treatment and comparison are the same. In the post-NLDAC period we partition the centers that enrolled and 
filed with NLDAC at some point in time following the creation of the NLDAC into those centers that filed in a given 
year and those that did not in the same year. The post-NLDAC trends illustrate that those centers in the later 
group possess a very similar trend to those centers that enrolled but never filed with NLDAC. However, once a 
center elects to file with NLDAC there is a substantial increase in the number of transplants conducted. This is the 
most restrictive specification we investigate as it divides the actively participating centers, those enrolled and 
filing with NLDAC, into those that did not file with NLDAC in a given year and those that did in a given year. Given 
that a center’s participation may vary across years, it allows for a given center to serve as their own control in a 
later time period when they elect to not enroll, provided that they elect to not file in a post-NLDAC year.14 
Partitioning the data set in this way illustrates transplant center behavior that is consistent with the hypothesis 
that NLDAC increased living donor kidney transplants for those centers that were actively filing versus not actively 
filing in a given year. The precise nature of our identification strategy will be discussed in more detail in the 
following section. 
Table 1 illustrates the descriptive statistics for the data used in our analysis. We elected to partition the 
data based on whether or not a center filed at least once with NLDAC in the post-NLDAC time period. The treated 
group contains all those centers that filed at least once in the post-NLDAC period. The untreated group contains 
                                                            
 
14 46% of the centers that filed with the NLDAC did not file in every year after the inception of the NLDAC. 




all centers that enrolled and never filed as well as those that never enrolled. The data set is also further 
partitioned based on the pre-NLDAC and post-NLDAC time periods. In addition, to the means and standard 
deviations we present the normalized differences proposed by Imbens and Rubin (2015) and discussed in Imbens 
and Wooldridge (2009).15 All of the variables illustrated, except for the monthly number of transplants, the 
number of patients on the waiting list and patient BMI were calculated as the percentage of patients on a center’s 
waiting list that possessed a particular characteristic (i.e., previous kidney transplant, male, etc.) at the beginning 
of the month-year observation period. 
The variables contained in Table 1 were used as covariate controls in our regression models discussed in 
the upcoming section. These variables were selected as they provide important demographic and health related 
information that may influence the rate of organ transplantation at the center. Data on a center’s waiting list 
helps to provide a measure of demand at each center that may influence their rate transplantation. Information 
about the gender and ethnic mix as well as the percentage who work, have higher education and are utilizing 
publicly funded medical care provide important socioeconomic data. The remaining covariates help to control for 
the health status of patients at the center (i.e., functional status, diabetes, previous transplants, BMI, 
hypertension, etc..) as well as the unique patient characteristics that may help explain the difficulties associated 
with transplantation (i.e., panel reactive antibodies (PRA) greater than 80). For instance, whether or not a patient 
has previously received an organ transplant is a factor in the allocation mechanism used to provide deceased 
donor organs. A patient’s functional status helps to provide a measure of the urgent needs of the patients on the 
waiting list. Lastly, patients with a PRA level greater than 80 are more difficult to find a suitable organ match. 
                                                            
 
15 The normalized difference is used in lieu of the t-test because large samples generate statistical differences. 
Imbens and Rubin (2015) rule of thumb is that a value greater than 0.25 makes the linear regression methods 
utilized to test for treatment effects sensitive to specification. 




In the pre-NLDAC time period the treated centers conducted approximately 2.8 living donor kidney 
transplants per a month (standard deviation of 3), whereas the untreated centers conducted approximately 0.8 
(standard deviation of 1.2). The treated centers also possessed a substantially larger number of patients on the 
waiting list in the pre-NLDAC period with approximately 332 wait listed patients (standard deviation of 400), 
whereas the untreated centers possessed only 111 patients (standard deviation of 184) on their waiting list. 
Centers that enrolled in the NLDAC program were clearly higher volume transplant centers. Patients at treated 
centers were more likely to have a higher BMI, a previous kidney transplant, a college education, employment 
income and to be on the expanded donor waiting list. These centers also had a lower percentage of waiting list 
patients utilizing public payment mechanisms. The other covariates were similar across the participating and 
nonparticipating centers. 
The differences observed in the pre-NLDAC period similarly arise in the post-NLDAC time period, with the 
exception that the nonparticipating centers in the post-NLDAC period also possessed a distinguishably higher 
percentage of males on their waiting list than participating centers. The differences illustrated highlight the 
importance of including these covariate controls in our regression modeling. Another interesting feature 
illustrated in the data is that the average monthly rate of living donor kidney transplants fell in the post-NLDAC 
time period for both the participating and nonparticipating centers. However, this shift is not discontinuous and 
the reduction is roughly the same for the participating and nonparticipating centers. Therefore the continuous 
nature of the data trends are preserved, validating our use of a difference-in-difference model.16 The 
participating centers conducted approximately 2.6 living donor kidney transplants (standard deviation of 3), 
whereas the nonparticipating centers conducted approximately 0.5 living donor kidney transplants (standard 
deviation of 1) in the post-NLDAC period. These trends are consistent with the number of living organ kidney 
                                                            
 
16 Further defense of the parallel trends is empirically illustrated in the Empirical Models and Results section. 




donors illustrated in Figure 1. At this same time the average waiting list at the participating centers increased to 
455 patients (standard deviation of 547) and 130 at nonparticipating centers (standard deviation of 144). 
5 Empirical Models and Results 
We estimated the impact of the NLDAC program on the number of living donor transplants in center i  at 
time t , itO , using a Poisson regression model with center and month-year fixed effects. The model parallels the 
residual plots in Figure 3 through 5.17 The model is, 
1 2 | / 1 ,= .it it it pat graft it enrolled it it i t itO Wait CMS NLDAC X eβ β γ δ α θ+ + + + + +  (1) 
The variable itWait  is the number of patients on center i s′  waiting list at the beginning of month t , 
| /it pat graftCMS  is a binary variable that takes a value of one if center i  does not meet the CMS CoP for either 
one-year graft survival or patient survival in period t  (the two CMS CoPs represent separate regressions) and 
,it enrolledNLDAC  is a binary variable that takes a value of one if center i  enrolled in the NLDAC program in 
period t . The matrix itX  contains a set of center-level covariate controls (see Table 1) that characterize the 
composition of a transplant center’s waiting list at the beginning of time period t . iα  is a center fixed effect to 
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binomial results can be obtained from the corresponding author. 




control for time invariant center-specific effects that affect the rate of living donor kidney transplantation and tθ  
are month-year fixed effects that control for any time varying macro effects. We clustered standard errors at the 
region level, where region is defined by the Organ Procurement Organization territories that serve as the primary 
basis for the allocation of deceased donor organs. The coefficient of primary interest is 1γ  as it provides a 
measure of NLDAC’s impact on those enrolled in the program. 
When estimating this model, as well as the other regressions specified, we investigate the robustness of 
our estimates to the inclusion and exclusion of the center fixed effects, iα , and month-year fixed effects, tθ . To 
preserve the difference-in-difference identification strategy we include the variable iEnrolled  when we remove 
the center fixed effects, iα . iEnrolled  takes a value of one for any center that enrolled with NLDAC. This is a 
time invariant variable which becomes collinear with iα  and is therefore removed when we include center fixed 
effects. When we elect to remove the month-year fixed effects, tθ , we include a variable tPost  that indicates 
whether or not the data observed is in the post-NLDAC period. When we include tθ  this variable is dropped due 
to collinearity as the post-NLDAC effects are subsumed in the month-year fixed effects, tθ . 
The second specification identifies the impact of NLDAC based on whether or not a center filed with 
NLDAC rather than just being enrolled in the program. The model includes an interaction term between the 
indicator variable for whether the center enrolled in NLDAC, ,it enrolledNLDAC , with another term that takes a 
value of one as soon as a center elected to file with NLDAC, ,it filedNLDAC , defined as enrolled and filing at least 
once in Figure 2. The revised difference-in-difference equation we estimate is, 
1 2 | / 1 ,=it it it pat graft it enrolledO Wait CMS NLDACβ β γ+ +  




2 , ,( ) ( ) .it enrolled it filed it it i t itNLDAC NLDAC X eγ δ α θ+ × + + + +  (2) 
The specification outlined in Equation 2 measures the treatment effect for centers that enrolled in NLDAC 
and then elected to actively file with NLDAC from the time period of first filing to the end of the data set. 
Therefore, the coefficient 2γ  captures the average treatment effect of all centers who ever filed with NLDAC 
following their first filing. We added another variable, iFiled , when the center fixed effects, iα , are omitted 
which indicates whether or not the center is one which enrolled and filed with NLDAC in our data set. This is a 
time invariant variable that holds across both pre- and post-NLDAC time periods. An alternative specification that 
exploits the timing of when centers elect to file with NLDAC as well as the fact that some centers elect to file in 
some years but not others is, 
1 2 | / 1 ,=it it it pat graft it enrolledO Wait CMS NLDACβ β γ+ +  
2 , ,( ) ( ) .it enrolled it active it it i t itNLDAC NLDAC X eγ δ α θ+ × + + + +  (3) 
The difference between Equation 2 and Equation 3 reflects alternative definitions of “participation” in the 
NLDAC program. The variable ,it activeNLDAC  is a binary variable that takes a value of one if the center elected to 
file with NLDAC in a given year and zero otherwise. Active centers in year t , ,it activeNLDAC , are a subset of 
those that filed an application at any point in the post-NLDAC period, ,it filedNLDAC . In this specification the 
treatment variable, 2γ , captures the treatment effect for centers that enrolled with NLDAC and actively filed a 
reimbursement claim in a particular year. We also include a variable iActive  when we remove the center fixed 
effects, iα , which is a time invariant indicator variable for all centers that enrolled with NLDAC and actively filed 
with them following the start of the NLDAC program. 




The final specification combines Equation 2 and Equation 3 and mirrors the partitioning of the data 
illustrated in Figure 5. The model we estimate is, 
1 2 | / 1 , 2 , ,= ( ) ( )it it it pat graft it enrolled it enrolled it filedO Wait CMS NLDAC NLDAC NLDACβ β γ γ+ + + ×  
3 , , ,( ) ( ) ( ) .it enrolled it filed it active it it i t itNLDAC NLDAC NLDAC X eγ δ α θ+ × × + + + +  (4) 
This specification is a quasi-triple difference estimator that uses a the triple interaction term to capture 
the impact of enrolling in NLDAC and filing a reimbursement claim with NLDAC in a given year. It is not a true 
triple difference model because we do not incorporate an interaction term between ,it filedNLDAC  and 
,it activeNLDAC  nor the interaction term between ,it enrolledNLDAC  and ,it activeNLDAC . These interactions are 
not included because they are identical to the triple interaction term contained in Equation 4 as centers which 
filed at some point following the creation of NLDAC or actively filed in a given year are by definition enrolled in 
NLDAC. To preserve the quasi-triple difference specification we incorporate the variables iEnrolled , tPost  and 
iFiled  as needed when we removed the center and month-year fixed effects.18 The treatment effect captured 
by 3γ  measures differences in the monthly number of transplants that can be attributed to a center filing an 
application with NLDAC at a given point in time and is identified using within center variation in the timing of 
centers’ NLDAC filings. 
Each of the regression models specified provides information on the NLDAC program. The first 
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specification, Equation 1, investigates the raw enrollment effects which we expect to be large because centers 
that enrolled in the program conducted a majority of the transplants in both the pre- and post-NLDAC period. Our 
results from estimating this model are biased upward by the selection effect of these transplant centers enrolling 
in NLDAC. The second specification, Equation 2, controls for the enrollment bias and estimates an average 
treatment effect for those centers who filed with NLDAC at any point in time. Given that ,it filedNDAC  takes a 
value of one as soon as a center elects to file with NLDAC and remains at one regardless of their future filing 
decisions, our estimates from this model capture the average treatment effect of filing with NLDAC in the 
post-NLDAC. The estimates from this model represent our purest estimates of the average treatment effects but if 
there are unobserved center-specific factors that are not controlled for by our center fixed effects or center 
specific covariates the results may be biased. However, we do believe that these factors are well controlled for in 
our empirical specification. 
Our third and forth specifications, Equations 3 and 4, attempt to purge out any of the unobserved 
center-specific information by using within transplant center variation in the timing of their filings with NLDAC. 
This is achieved through the use of the variable ,it activeNLDAC  that takes a value of one only in the years that a 
center filed for reimbursement with NLDAC. This group is a subset of those that have filed and therefore these 
estimates attempt to further refine our estimates obtained using Equation 2. In these specifications a center may 
serve as its own control when they elect to file for a reimbursement with NLDAC in a given year. However, if there 
are unobserved time specific factors that influence a center’s filing decision (i.e., an increased flow of low income 
donors in a given month) this may bias the results. Comparing the results from Equation 2 with those obtained 
from Equations 3 and 4 will provide information on this potential bias. 
Regardless of the empirical specification utilized the identification strategy employed requires that the 
pre-NLDAC trends in the data are parallel for our defined treatment and control groups. Given the large amount of 
data we have during the pre-NLDAC time period this can be empirically tested. To conduct a test of our 
identification strategy we estimate the following set of models using the data from the pre-NLDAC time period, 




1 2 | / 1 2=it it it pat graft t iO Wait CMS Trend Enrolledβ β γ γ+ + +  
3 t i it it i t itTrend Enrolled X eγ δ α θ+ × + + + +  (5) 
1 2 | / 1 2=it it it pat graft t iO Wait CMS Trend Filedβ β γ γ+ + +  
3 t i it it i t itTrend Filed X eγ δ α θ+ × + + + +  (6) 
1 2 | / 1 2 3=it it it pat graft t i iO Wait CMS Trend Enrolled Filedβ β γ γ γ+ + + +  
4 5 .t i t i it it i t itTrend Enrolled Trend Filed X eγ γ δ α θ+ × + × + + + +  (7) 
The variable tTrend  is a time trend variable, iEnrolled  and iFiled  are variables that indicate 
whether or not a center was enrolled in the NLDAC, or enrolled and filed with the NLDAC respectively in the 
post-NLDAC time period. All of the other variables are as defined earlier. In order for our identification strategy to 
be valid we require that coefficient on 3γ  in Equations 5 and 6 and the coefficient on 5γ  in Equation 7 to be 
statistically insignificant. The results from these regressions are contained in Table 2 when we use the covariate 
control |it graftCMS .19 The results in Table 2 support our hypothesis that the pre-NLDAC data trends are parallel 
across our different treatment and control groups in the analysis and consistent with the graphical representation 
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of the data trends provided in Figures 3 through 5. The only statistically significant coefficients arise for the 
variable t iTrend Enrolled×  when we do not control for either transplant center heterogeneity using the center 
fixed effects, iα , or month-year fixed effects, tθ .20 However, when we control for both fixed effects the 
coefficients are all consistent with our identification strategy. 
Having defended our identification strategy, the results from the four sets of regressions are illustrated in 
Tables 3 and 4, which are broken down by whether or not the one-year graft or patient survival CMS CoP variables 
were utilized in the regression model.21 In each Table there are four panels that correspond with the different 
regression specifications utilized. Panel A contains the regression results for Equation 1, Panel B contains the 
results for Equation 2, Panel C contains the regression results for Equation 3 and Panel D contains the regression 
results for Equation 4. The different columns in each panel correspond with alternative specifications resulting 
from including or not including different combinations of the fixed effect variables iα  and tθ , which are labeled 
in each panel of Tables 3 and 4. The coefficients are presented as incident rate ratios and can be interpreted as 
percent changes in monthly living donor kidney transplants. 
                                                            
 
20 When we use center fixed effects, iα , the iEnrolled  variable is removed from the model and when we use 
month-year fixed effects, tθ , the iTrend  variable is removed for collinearity concerns. 
21 The two measures are collinear and often go hand in hand, however the one-year patient survival CMS CoP 
occurs slightly less than the 1-year graft survival measure. Due to this close relationship between the two 
measures we elected to run separate regressions for each CMS CoP versus one regression with both CMS CoP 
variables. 




The coefficient on itWait  indicates that a one unit increase in a center’s waiting list increases its rate of 
living donor kidney transplantation by between 0.03% and 0.06%. The stability of the coefficients across Table 3 
and 4 suggest that either of the CMS CoPs is sufficient to control for the regulatory pressures that a transplant 
center faces. In nearly all of the specifications when a center does not meet the CMS CoP they reduce their 
volume of living donor kidney transplants.22 Our preferred specification, which contains center and month-year 
fixed effects, indicates that there is a large reduction, 13%, in the number of living donor transplants in centers 
that do not meet the CMS standards. 
The incidence rate ratios for our first empirical specification with month-year and center fixed effects 
indicate that enrolling in NLDAC generated a 22% increase in the monthly number of living donor organ 
transplants. Estimates vary widely depending on the specification, ranging from around 14% when we include only 
transplant center fixed effects to 78% when we include only month-year fixed effects. This highlights the 
importance of controlling for center-level heterogeneity as well as the macro time trends in living donor organ 
transplantation during this time period. The results from our second specification, Equation 2, illustrate that there 
is in fact a selection effect associated with enrollment in NLDAC as the coefficient on ,it enrolledNLDAC  is 
statistically significant and positive when we control for both center and month-year fixed effects. However, the 
treatment variable of interest, the coefficient on , ,it enrolled it filedNLDAC NLDAC× , indicates that the monthly 
number of transplants increased for centers that enrolled with NLDAC and had filed at least once with them in the 
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center-level fixed effects, iα . However, the CMS effects are robust across all of our most preferred specifications 
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post-NLDAC period. This increase ranges from approximately 11% to 46% depending on the specification. Our 
preferred specification, the one that controls for both center fixed and month-year fixed effects, indicates that the 
monthly number of living donor transplants increased by approximately 14% among those centers that enrolled in 
NLDAC and subsequently filed a request for cost assistance. This represents the average treatment effect of 
enrolling in NLDAC and filing at least once for cost assistance in the post-NLDAC time period. 
As mentioned earlier, our second specification, Equation 2, does not use information on the timing of a 
center’s filing following their first filing with NLDAC. The specification outlined in Equation 3 does address the 
timing of a center’s filings following their first filing with NLDAC. The treatment variable of interest, the coefficient 
on , ,it enrolled it activeNLDAC NLDAC× , indicates that the monthly number of living donor organ transplants 
increased by almost 15% when a center enrolled in NLDAC and actively filed with NLDAC in a given year. Again, 
these values vary substantially depending on whether or not we include center or month-year fixed effects and in 
the case of the 1-year patient survival model are actually statistically insignificant when we do not include center 
fixed effects. 
In the fourth specification each participating center may serves as its own control.23 The model includes 
the following interaction terms; , ,it enrolled it filedNLDAC NLDAC×  and 
, , ,it enrolled it filed it activeNLDAC NLDAC NLDAC× × . By construction our treatment variable captures the impact of 
NLDAC on a center that has enrolled in the program, has already filed with NLDAC at some point in time and 
actively filed in the current year versus the same center when it was not actively filing with NLDAC in a given year. 
As mentioned earlier, this specification may be biased if their are unobserved time specific factors that determine 
                                                            
 
23 54% of centers that filed with NLDAC actively filed in each year following their initial filing. 




when a center elects to file. However, the decision to file in a given year depends on the pool of patients who seek 
treatment in that time period and the availability of living organ donors for those patients. The centers do not 
have control over these factors so for the most part these are exogenous factors. 
The treatment effect for our fourth specification, Equation 4, ranges from approximately 84% to 14% 
depending on the model specification. The largest treatment effects are observed when we do not utilize 
transplant center fixed effects. As was the case with the other specifications this highlights the importance of 
controlling for center level heterogeneity. Focusing on the specification that controls for both center level 
heterogeneity and month-year time trends we can see that the treatment effect is remarkable stable. The 
parameter estimate for the 1-year graft survival model indicates an increase in living donor transplants of 14.37% 
and the 1-year patient survival model results generate an increase of 13.79%; the average is 14.08%. 
The estimates for our second through fourth specification, Equations 2 through 4, are all remarkably 
stable and similar. The estimates from our preferred specification, that which controls for center and month year 
fixed effects, indicate that treatment effect varies between 13.49% and 14.37% for the 1-year graft survival CMS 
CoP models and between 13.79% and 14.72% for the 1-year patient survival CMS CoP models. Although each of 
these models possesses inherent strengths and weaknesses the results allow us to comfortably state that filing for 
cost reimbursement with NLDAC increased the monthly rate of living organ transplantation by approximately 14%. 
Furthermore, the confidence intervals for each of these different treatment effects overlaps one another, further 
highlighting the consistency of our results. 
Our most conservative estimate of the impact that the NLDAC had on the number of living donor kidney 
transplants indicates that it increased them by 13.5% (SE 7.1%). The estimates come from our second specification 
and the 1-year graft survival CMS CoP model when we control for transplant center and month-year fixed effects. 
Transplant centers enrolled and participating in NLDAC performed an average of 29 living donor kidney 




transplants per year. There were 136 centers that we observed filing with NLDAC for living donor assistance in the 
final year of our analysis, 2012. We estimate that NLDAC increased the number of living donor kidney transplants 
by approximately 532 [95% CI: 16-1115] procedures annually (=0.135*29*136).24 The actual number of living 
donor kidney transplants supported by NLDAC in 2012, the last year of our analysis, was 426. Our empirical results 
suggest that none of these transplants would have happened without the support of NLDAC (532 > 426). 
However, there is a wide confidence interval around the point estimate, so we do not have a high degree of 
confidence in this conclusion. This result is consistent with the post-transplantation surveys conducted by NLDAC 
that indicate nearly three-quarters of the kidney transplants would not have taken place if the compensation was 
not provided (Mathur et al. 2014). 
Matas and Schnitzler (2004) calculate that a living donor kidney transplant (versus dialysis) reduces health 
care costs by $94,579 (US dollars, 2002) and results in a gain of 3.5 quality-adjusted life years (QALY). Inflating cost 
savings to 2013 dollars using the all-time consumer price index and valuing a QALY at $100,000, a living donor 
kidney transplant is associated with a net gain to society of $473,000. This figure and the results presented in the 
previous paragraph imply that NLDAC was associated with a benefit of $252 million [95% CI: $8 million-$527 
million] (evaluated in 2013 dollars). This figure far exceeds the approximately $1.8 million that NLDAC recently 
spent on donor aid.25 
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outcome of a patient if they did not receive a living organ transplant at a particular point in time. Therefore, we 
have elected to utilize the more conservative estimates of the benefits derived by Matas and Schnitzler (2004) 




All of the estimates discussed do not account for any form of temporal decay in the treatment or 
anticipatory efforts made by the transplant centers. If centers increased their rates of living organ transplantation 
prior to their enrollment in NLDAC, indicating an anticipatory effort, it would bias our parameter estimates 
downward as well as violate our fundamental assumption that the NLDAC program is exogenous. Temporal 
treatment decay is important to investigate to determine whether or not the treatment effects we observe 
continue beyond the inception of the NLDAC or were they transitory and perhaps the result of an immediate 
clearing out of potential donors that perviously were unable to be a living organ donor. To investigate this in more 
detail we re-estimated Equation 1 and Equation 2 with time varying treatment coefficients. The time varying 
treatment coefficients contain a twelve month pre- and post- treatment variable lag as well as a parameter for the 
first month of the treatment and another for all periods of time beyond the twelfth month of initial treatment. 
The results from these estimations are contained in Figure 6 with 90% confidence intervals.26 
The parameter estimates in Figure 6 indicate that all of the pre-treatment coefficients are not statistically 
significant from one, suggesting that centers did not increase transplant volumes in anticipation of the NLDAC 
program. The treatment effects from our modified Equation 1 are all statistically significant and higher than an 
incidence rate of one. Furthermore, the treatment effect is stable across the post-treatment time period. The 
estimates for Equation 2 are very similar to those observed for Equation 1 in the pretreatment period and there 
does not appear to be any statistically significant anticipatory effects observed among centers that enrolled in 
NLDAC and then elected to file their first claim with NLDAC. The post-NLDAC treatment variables do not indicate 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
that focus on the QALYs generated following transplantation. 
26 It is not possible to estimate pre- and post-treatment variables for Equations 3 and 4 because the 
,it activeNLDAC  variable is a subset of the ,it filedNLDAC  variable used to define the timing of our treatment 
variable. 




as strong of a treatment effect as observed with the re-estimation of Equation 1 as only a little over half of the 
treatment parameters are significantly different from an incidence rate of one. This said, the upward trajectory in 
the point estimates is consistent with that observed in our re-estimation of Equation 1. 
Given the impact that the inclusion of transplant center fixed effects has on our estimates, we decided to 
investigate where the primary treatment effects arise within the distribution of kidney transplant centers. We 
calculated the average number of living donor kidney transplants conducted for each center during our time 
period of analysis and ranked them from highest to lowest. We then created dummy variables for each quartile 
and interacted these dummy variable with the treatment and control variables used in the model to determine 
whether or not the treatment effect is heterogeneous across the distribution of transplant centers using the same 
Poisson regression framework outlined earlier. The results from this specification are contained in Tables 5 and 6 
for the two CMS CoPs respectively. 
Focusing on the treatment variables illustrated in Tables 5 and 6 we see that the NLDAC program has had 
no impact on those centers in the highest quartile of the living donor kidney transplantation activity. Our first 
parameterization, Equation 1, illustrates that we observe a treatment effect for only the lowest quartile of the 
distribution where we observe an increase in living donor organ transplants of approximately 93%. Our estimates 
for our second parameterization, Equation 2, indicate that the NLDAC program increased living donor organ 
transplants for the second and fourth quartile by approximately 12% and 57% respectively.27 Our third 
specification, Equation 3, generates the broadest spread in the treatment effect as all of the quartiles possess a 
treatment effect except the highest quartile. The treatment effects are lowest for the second highest quartile, 
17%, and highest for the lowest quartile, 55-56%, with the third quartile possessing a treatment effect of 
approximately 26-27%. The last specification, corresponding to the redefined Equation 4, generates a treatment 
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effect for only the lower two quartiles. The second lowest quartile possesses a treatment effect between 40-42% 
whereas the lowest quartile possesses a treatment effect of 36-37%. 
These results indicate that the impact of the NLDAC was minimal at the upper tail of the distribution but 
sizable at the lower tail of the activity distribution. One possible explanation is that those centers at the upper tail 
of the distribution are already conducting a sufficiently large number of living donor kidney transplants and their 
pool of potential donors is sufficient to meet their current demands. Alternatively, such centers may have reached 
internal resource limits that constrain further increases in the number of living donor kidney transplants. On the 
opposite end of the spectrum is the lower tail of the distribution where they may not have a sufficient supply of 
living organ donors and the program has allowed them to utilize a previously unusable pool of potential donors. A 
more rigorous investigation of the cause of this heterogeneity is beyond the scope of this research effort, but it is 
clear that the treatment effect of NLDAC is not homogeneous and concentrated more at the lower tail of the living 
donor kidney transplant distribution. 
6 Falsification Tests 
We conduct two separate falsification tests to validate the estimated impact of the NLDAC program on 
living donor kidney transplantation. The first tests the effect of the NLDAC program on deceased donor kidney 
transplants. The NLDAC program did not directly target deceased donor kidney transplantation so we would 
expect that the NLDAC program would either have had no effect on deceased donor kidney transplantation or it 
may have a negative effect because there is a substitution effect between living and deceased donor kidney 
transplants (Howard 2011, Fernandez et al. 2013). Table 7 illustrates our falsification test results using deceased 
donor kidney transplantation. In this table we reproduce our preferred specification contained in Tables 3 and 4 
for each of the four models and juxtapose those estimates with the estimated treatment that the NLDAC program 
had on the exact same center’s monthly levels of deceased donor kidney transplants. For all of the specifications 
estimated we find that the NLDAC program had no statistically significant impact on the monthly number of 
deceased donor kidney transplants conducted by the same centers investigated in our research. Although the 
parameter estimates are not statistically significant it is interesting to note that our fourth specification, Equation 




4, generates a small and statistically insignificant negative effect (incidence rate is below one, but not statistically 
significant).28 
The second falsification test we conduct investigates the effect of the NLDAC program on the monthly 
number of thoracic transplants (heart, lung, and heart-lung transplants combined). Hearts and lungs are obtained 
from deceased donors only, and so we would not expect the NLDAC program to have an impact on their volume. 
During the time period studied there were 129 transplant centers that conducted non-pediatric thoracic 
transplants and there are 119 centers that conducted both non-pediatric thoracic transplants and living donor 
kidney transplants. For each of these samples we estimated the empirical models and compared the treatment 
effects. We did not include a control for the number of patients waiting for a kidney transplant or the waiting list 
control variables, itX , in the thoracic transplant regression set up as the kidney waiting list is not applicable to 
this population. Furthermore, waiting for a thoracic transplant for an extended period of time is not feasible, given 
the lack of substitutes for a thoracic transplant, whereas with kidney transplantation a patient can be treated with 
dialysis and continue waiting for an organ. 
The regression results are contained in Table 8 and they further validate the estimated relationship 
between the NLDAC program and living donor kidney transplantation. The table presents results for the living 
donor kidney transplant center volume juxtaposed with the results for thoracic transplant volume to facilitate 
comparison. The results for the living donor kidney transplant center volume are similar to those illustrated in 
Tables 3 and 4, except for the fact that we limit these regressions to only those 119 centers that conducted both 
kidney and thoracic transplants. Including the full sample of living donor kidney centers would potentially bias the 
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results in favor of our falsification test. The restricted sample was used to illustrate that the NLDAC program still 
had a positive impact on the center’s volume of living donor kidney transplants for those that did both thoracic 
and living donor kidney transplants. 
In all of our specifications the treatment effect for thoracic transplants was statistically insignificant. This 
indicates that NLDAC program has had no impact on the rate of thoracic transplants conducted by the 129 
transplant centers that conducted thoracic transplants during our time period of study. The treatment effects on 
living donor kidney transplants for the 119 centers that conducted both living donor kidney and thoracic 
transplants is statistically significant for the specifications illustrated in Equation 3 and Equation 4. The treatment 
effect it is not statistically significant for the specification illustrated in Equation 1 and Equation 2, however the 
sign is as expected for Equation 2. The treatment effects for our estimation of Equation 3 are approximately 15% 
for both of the CMS CoP specifications and the treatment effect for Equation 4 is 22% for the graft survival CMS 
CoP and 21% for the patient survival CMS CoP. 
The combination of these results clearly supports our hypothesis that the NLDAC is associated with a 
sizable increase in living donor kidney transplantation. Our initial treatment effect for the complete sample is 
approximately 14%. This estimate is consistent with the treatment effect observed among the 119 transplant 
centers that conducted both living donor kidney and thoracic transplants. Finally, the lack of a treatment effect on 
thoracic transplants for the 129 centers that conducted thoracic transplants validates the treatment effects 
observed in our complete sample. 
7 Conclusion 
We find that the NLDAC program increased the monthly number of living donor kidney transplants by 
approximately 14% for those centers that enrolled and actively participated. These findings contribute to the 
growing literature on the impact that programs targeted at reducing donor out-of-pocket costs have had on organ 
donation (Boulware et al. 2008; Lacetera et al. 2014; Venkataramani et al. 2012; Wellington and Sayre 2011). 
Contrary to these earlier papers, we find that the NLDAC offset donor costs enough to have a positive effect on 




donor behavior. Conventional estimates of the aggregate annual welfare gains from NLDAC exceed $220 million.29 
Our results imply that in the pre-NLDAC period some potential donors did not donate because of the costs 
associated with travel. If a living donor kidney transplant is associated with such substantial health 
benefits–benefits that exceed average travel costs ($2,800) at least by a factor of 25 if not much more–why 
weren’t donors and recipients willing to incur these costs? The fact that they were not suggests some combination 
of 1) altruism for some donors on the margin is low, 2) some recipients believe, incorrectly, it is illegal for them to 
pay their donor’s travel expenses, or 3) many donors and recipients face severe credit constraints. Regardless, the 
results from our analysis clearly indicate that the NLDAC program provided a sufficient amelioration of the 
financial disincentives to support the altruistic motives of the donors. The financial benefits of the program to the 
health care system have far exceeded the costs. 
Our findings indicate that programs used to offset some of the costs that donors incur in the process of 
donation increase living donation rates. The success of NLDAC does not imply that the U.S. should adopt a 
full-scale market for organs. Under such a market, donors would have positive net benefits and the donor pool 
would include donors who donate solely for financial gain as well as for altruistic motivates. If the extrinsic 
benefits from donating are sufficiently large, it is possible that incentives could crowd-out prosocial, 
intrinsically-motivated behavior (Bènabou and Tirole 2006). In the context of living kidney donation, as the 
number of financially-motivated donors increases, the altruistically-minded individuals who are the target of 
NLDAC assistance may begin to drop-out of the donor pool. 
The experience of NLDAC shows that it is possible to use financial incentives without violating NOTA’s 
"valuable consideration" clause or risking crowd-out of intrinsic motivation. Gaston et al. (2006) proposed a more 
                                                            
 
29 This statistic is based on NLDAC activity in 2012 and varies depending on year. 




ambitious program that would provide a one-year term life insurance policy for living donors, health insurance to 
cover their future risks, the reimbursement of a broader set of donor related expenses and either a tax deduction 
of $10,000 or a direct payment of $5,000, perhaps our results can be used to support piloting this program at a 
small scale to investigate its efficacy. Our results suggest that potential living organ donors are sensitive to the 
costs of donating and programs to make donors whole by compensating them for the actual and expected costs 
associated with donating could increase donation rates. Given the potential gains from increasing the number of 
living donors, the government may want to consider conducting a pilot program that provides benefits above and 
beyond the limited compensation offered by NLDAC. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. The treated group represents those centers that enrolled in NLDAC and filed for 
assistance at least once in the post-NLDAC period. The untreated group contains all centers that enrolled in 
NLDAC and never filed in the post-NLDAC period as well as those that never enrolled. All observations are based 
on monthly time intervals and % variables are calculated as a percentage of the center’s waiting list. The variables 
are defined as: Monthly Transplants - monthly number of living donor kidney transplants; Waiting List - patients 
on a transplant center’s waiting list; % Prev. TX - previously received a kidney transplant; % Male - percentage 
male; Mean BMI - the average BMI for patients on the waiting list; % Work Income - percentage employed; % 
Higher Educ. - percentage with higher education (at least some college education); % Func. Stat 1 - does not 
require physical assistance; % Func. Stat 2. - requires minimal physical assistance; % Other Func. Stat - other 
functional status; % Public Pay - receiving public funding (i.e., Medicare) for their transplant; % COPD - chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease; % Exh. Perit. Vasc. - exhausted peritoneal access; % Prev. Malig. - previous 
malignancy; % White - white ethnicity; % Black - black ethnicity; % Asian - asian ethnicity; % Other Ethn. - other 
ethnicity; % Type 1 Diab. - type one diabetes; % Type 2 Diab. - type two diabetes; %HBV Core - Hepatitis B core 
antibody; % HBV Sur. Ant. - Hepatitis B surface antigen; %HCV Sero. - Hepatitis C positive; % VAD - some form of 
life support; % Expanded Donor - On expanded donor list; %Hypertension - hypertension; %PRA> 80 - percentage 
of the waiting list with a PRA greater than 80%.* indicates that the normalized differences exceed the 0.25 
threshold proposed by Imbens and Rubin (2015). 





 Pre-NLDAC  Post-NLDAC 
Variable Treated Untreated Norm. Diff. Treated Untreated Norm. Diff. 
Monthly 
Transplants 
2.795 0.763 0.619* 2.564 0.534 0.637* 
 (3.046) (1.231)  (3.000) (1.090)  
Waiting List 332.229 110.682 0.570* 454.542 129.365 0.575* 
 (396.151) (183.979)  (546.966) (143.544)  
% Prev. TX 0.068 0.047 0.265* 0.035 0.029 0.110 
 (0.050) (0.059)  (0.029) (0.051)  
% Male 0.577 0.603 -0.138 0.584 0.646 -0.324* 
 (0.052) (0.184)  (0.051) (0.184)  
Mean BMI 26.809 25.906 0.322* 26.807 26.223 0.357* 
 (0.789) (2.694)  (0.859) (1.395)  
% Work Income 0.065 0.034 0.354* 0.095 0.051 0.451* 
 (0.067) (0.057)  (0.068) (0.070)  
% Higher Educ. 0.352 0.276 0.335* 0.408 0.313 0.378* 




 (0.136) (0.183)  (0.128) (0.216)  
% Func. Stat. 1 0.776 0.808 -0.111 0.613 0.629 -0.046 
 (0.203) (0.204)  (0.237) (0.258)  
% Func Stat. 2 0.107 0.105 0.009 0.196 0.150 0.169 
 (0.146) (0.165)  (0.203) (0.189)  
% Other Func. 
Stat. 
0.117 0.080 0.178 0.190 0.220 -0.087 
 (0.163) (0.129)  (0.228) (0.259)  
% Public Pay. 0.276 0.396 -0.352* 0.558 0.645 -0.313* 
 (0.187) (0.286)  (0.135) (0.244)  
% COPD 0.011 0.012 -0.023 0.014 0.017 -0.017 
 (0.016) (0.041)  (0.174) (0.029)  
% Exh. Perit. Vasc. 0.049 0.038 0.147 0.052 0.043 0.112 
 (0.051) (0.055)  (0.055) (0.059)  
% Prev. Malig. 0.034 0.040 -0.061 0.050 0.072 -0.140 
 (0.025) (0.095)  (0.033) (0.154)  




% White 0.474 0.415 0.175 0.459 0.432 0.078 
 (0.216) (0.253)  (0.221) (0.274)  
% Black 0.324 0.320 0.012 0.316 0.315 0.004 
 (0.217) (0.241)  (0.210) (0.249)  
% Asian 0.127 0.168 -0.155 0.148 0.174 -0.086 
 (0.166) (0.205)  (0.192) (0.242)  
% Other Ethn. 0.075 0.090 -0.082 0.076 0.079 -0.017 
 (0.099) (0.154)  (0.095) (0.150)  
% Type 1 Diab. 0.035 0.022 0.148 0.063 0.049 0.246 
 (0.042) (0.034)  (0.044) (0.081)  
% Type 2 Diab. 0.101 0.082 0.122 0.284 0.257 0.121 
 (0.098) (0.118)  (0.097) (0.205)  
% HBV Core 0.033 0.022 0.197 0.019 0.015 0.094 
 (0.040) (0.039)  (0.028) (0.032)  
% HBV Sur. Ant. 0.009 0.010 -0.022 0.007 0.005 0.094 
 (0.012) (0.044)  (0.013) (0.017)  




% HCV Sero. 0.021 0.014 0.205 0.010 0.007 0.176 
 (0.018) (0.029)  (0.011) (0.013)  
% VAD 0.273 0.243 0.036 0.013 0.008 0.181 
 (0.814) (0.220)  (0.020) (0.019)  
% Expanded 
Donor 
0.476 0.332 0.319* 0.473 0.362 0.279* 
 (0.315) (0.323)  (0.264) (0.297)  
% Hypertension 0.806 0.781 0.088 0.646 0.674 -0.179 
 (0.164) (0.231)  (0.074) (0.143)  
% PRA> 80 0.058 0.054 0.039 0.052 0.075 -0.140 
 (0.054) (0.088)  (0.054) (0.154)  
Number of Obs. 10,108 2,595  11,520 2,564  
Table 2: Identification Test Results. All coefficients are expressed as incidence rate ratios and the standard errors 
have been clustered at the regional DSA managed by each of the OPOs. Panel A: parameter estimates for Equation 
5. Panel B: parameter estimates for Equation 6. Panel C: parameter estimates for Equation 7. ***indicates 
statistically significant at the 1% level, **indicates statistically significant at the 5% level and *indicates statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
 




 Panel A  
t iTrend Enrolled×  1.0115* 1.0025 1.0125* 1.0029 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
 Controls  
Center FE No Yes No Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE No No Yes Yes 
Pseudo 2R  0.2162 0.4092 0.2215 0.4135 
 Panel B  
t iTrend Filed×  1.0002 1.0001 1.0004 1.0002 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
 Controls  
Center FE No Yes No Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE No No Yes Yes 
Pseudo 2R  0.2226 0.4092 0.2277 0.4135 
 Panel C  




t iTrend Enrolled×  1.0147* 1.0029 1.0155* 1.0033 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) 
t iTrend Filed×  0.9966 0.9996 0.9967 0.9996 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
 Controls  
Center FE No Yes No Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE No No Yes Yes 
Pseudo 2R  0.2229 0.4092 0.2281 0.4135 
Table 3: Regression Results: 1-year Graft Survival CMS CoP. All coefficients are expressed as incidence rate ratios 
and the standard errors have been clustered at the regional DSA managed by each of the OPOs. Panel A: 
parameter estimates for Equation 1. Panel B: parameter estimates for Equation 2. Panel C: parameter estimates 
for Equation 3. Panel D: parameter estimates for Equation 4. ***indicates statistically significant at the 1% level, 
**indicates statistically significant at the 5% level and *indicates statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
 Panel A  
itWait  1.0006*** 1.0003** 1.0006*** 1.0004** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 





0.7526** 0.8684*** 0.7556** 0.8686*** 
 (0.087) (0.032) (0.086) (0.031) 
,it enrolledNLDAC  
1.3662*** 1.1382*** 1.7722*** 1.2180*** 
 (0.095) (0.046) (0.198) (0.070) 
 Controls  
Center FE No Yes No Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE No No Yes Yes 
Pseudo 2R  0.2197 0.4058 0.2253 0.4109 
 Panel B  
itWait  1.0006*** 1.0003* 1.0006*** 1.0003** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
graftCMS  
0.7780** 0.8737*** 0.7815** 0.8747*** 
 (0.091) (0.033) (0.091) (0.032) 
,it enrolledNLDAC  
1.0863 1.0632 1.4942*** 1.1781*** 
 (0.082) (0.046) (0.157) (0.066) 




, ,( ) ( )it enrolled it filedNLDAC NLDAC×  
1.3368*** 1.1052* 1.4445*** 1.1349** 
 (0.119) (0.057) (0.147) (0.071) 
 Controls  
Center FE No Yes No Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE No No Yes Yes 
Pseudo 2R  0.2314 0.4060 0.2377 0.4111 
 Panel C  
itWait  1.0005*** 1.0003* 1.0005*** 1.0003** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
graftCMS  
0.7790** 0.8713*** 0.7807** 0.8714*** 
 (0.087) (0.032) (0.086) (0.031) 
,it enrolledNLDAC  
1.0005 1.0570 1.4483*** 1.1805*** 
 (0.069) (0.044) (0.148) (0.067) 
, ,( ) ( )it enrolled it activeNLDAC NLDAC×  
1.5805*** 1.1249*** 1.6497*** 1.1456*** 
 (0.124) (0.047) (0.142) (0.054) 




 Controls  
Center FE No Yes No Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE No No Yes Yes 
Pseudo 2R  0.2368 0.4062 0.2433 0.4114 
 Panel D  
itWait  1.0005*** 1.0003* 1.0005*** 1.0003** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
graftCMS  
0.7721** 0.8707*** 0.7762** 0.8715*** 
 (0.087) (0.033) (0.086) (0.032) 
,it enrolledNLDAC  
1.0808 1.0618 1.4909*** 1.1801*** 
 (0.082) (0.046) (0.153) (0.066) 
, ,( ) ( )it enrolled it filedNLDAC NLDAC×  
0.7820** 0.9835 0.8331* 1.0028 
 (0.076) (0.058) (0.085) (0.068) 
, ,( ) ( )it enrolled it filedNLDAC NLDAC×  
1.8430*** 1.1371*** 1.8390*** 1.1437*** 




,( )it activeNLDAC×  
(0.172) (0.054) (0.172) (0.055) 
 Controls  
Center FE No Yes No Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE No No Yes Yes 
Pseudo 2R  0.2375 0.4062 0.2436 0.4114 
Table 4: Regression Results: 1-year Patient Survival CMS CoP. All coefficients are expressed as incidence rate ratios 
and the standard errors have been clustered at the regional DSA managed by each of the OPOs. Panel A: 
parameter estimates for Equation 1. Panel B: parameter estimates for Equation 2. Panel C: parameter estimates 
for Equation 3. Panel D: parameter estimates for Equation 4. ***indicates statistically significant at the 1% level, 
**indicates statistically significant at the 5% level and *indicates statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
  Panel A  
itWait  1.0006*** 1.0003* 1.0006*** 1.0003** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
patientCMS  
1.0537 0.8663*** 1.0586 0.8716*** 
 (0.132) (0.038) (0.134) (0.039) 
,it enrolledNLDAC  
1.3724*** 1.1378*** 1.7843*** 1.2216*** 




 (0.098) (0.046) (0.206) (0.070) 
 Controls  
Center FE No Yes No Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE No No Yes Yes 
Pseudo 2R  0.2187 0.4059 0.2244 0.4109 
 Panel B  
itWait  1.0006*** 1.0003* 1.0006*** 1.0003** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
patientCMS  
1.0659 0.8670*** 1.0602 0.8698*** 
 (0.122) (0.037) (0.121) (0.038) 
,it enrolledNLDAC  
1.0824 1.0604 1.4960*** 1.1796*** 
 (0.082) (0.045) (0.161) (0.065) 
, ,( ) ( )it enrolled it filedNLDAC NLDAC×  
1.3507*** 1.1090** 1.4577*** 1.1416** 
 (0.118) (0.056) (0.146) (0.070) 
 Controls  




Center FE No Yes No Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE No No Yes Yes 
Pseudo 2R  0.2307 0.4061 0.2370 0.4112 
 Panel C  
itWait  1.0005*** 1.0003* 1.0005*** 1.0003** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
patientCMS  
1.0670 0.8677*** 1.0639 0.8714*** 
 (0.115) (0.037) (0.114) (0.037) 
,it enrolledNLDAC  
1.0006 1.0563 1.4516*** 1.1835*** 
 (0.069) (0.043) (0.153) (0.067) 
, ,( ) ( )it enrolled it activeNLDAC NLDAC×  
1.5884*** 1.1256*** 1.6569*** 1.1472*** 
 (0.123) (0.046) (0.140) (0.053) 
 Controls  
Center FE No Yes No Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE No No Yes Yes 




Pseudo 2R  0.2361 0.4063 0.2426 0.4114 
 Panel D  
itWait  1.0005*** 1.0003* 1.0005*** 1.0003** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
patientCMS  
1.0635 0.8677*** 1.0644 0.8712*** 
 (0.114) (0.037) (0.113) (0.037) 
,it enrolledNLDAC  
1.0763 1.0590 1.4917*** 1.1815*** 
 (0.082) (0.045) (0.158) (0.065) 
, ,( ) ( )it enrolled it filedNLDAC NLDAC×  
0.7920** 0.9906 0.8421* 1.0135 
 (0.077) (0.057) (0.086) (0.067) 
, ,( ) ( )it enrolled it filedNLDAC NLDAC×  
1.8384*** 1.1325*** 1.8357*** 1.1379*** 
,( )it activeNLDAC×  
(0.172) (0.053) (0.173) (0.054) 
 Controls  
Center FE No Yes No Yes 




Mnth/Yr FE No No Yes Yes 
Pseudo 2R  0.2367 0.4063 0.2428 0.4114 
Table 5: Regression Results: 1-year Graft Survival CMS CoP. All coefficients are expressed as incidence rate ratios 
and the standard errors have been clustered at the regional DSA managed by each of the OPOs. Panel A: 
parameter estimates for Equation 1. Panel B: parameter estimates for Equation 2. Panel C: parameter estimates 
for Equation 3. Panel D: parameter estimates for Equation 4. ***indicates statistically significant at the 1% level, 
**indicates statistically significant at the 5% level and *indicates statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
  Panel A  
 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
,it enrolledNLDAC  
1.0422 1.0724 1.0342 1.9369*** 
 (0.069) (0.078) (0.110) (0.482) 
  Controls   
Center FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo 2R  0.4112    
 Panel B  




 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
,( )it enrolledNLDAC  
1.0361 1.12266* 1.1005 1.5643** 
,( )it filedNLDAC×  
(0.056) (0.135) (0.096) (0.291) 
 Controls  
Center FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo 2R  0.4116    
 Panel C  
 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
,( )it enrolledNLDAC  
1.0555 1.1655** 1.2701*** 1.5533*** 
× ,( )it activeNLDAC  (0.049) (0.088) (0.101) (0.195) 
 Controls  
Center FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Pseudo 2R  0.4118    
 Panel D  
 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
,( )it enrolledNLDAC  
1.1111 1.0768 1.4229*** 1.3690** 
,( )it filedNLDAC×  
(0.081) (0.070) (0.141) (0.206) 
,( )it activeNLDAC×      
  Controls   
Center FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo 2R  0.4119    
Table 6: Regression Results: 1-year Patient Survival CMS CoP. All coefficients are expressed as incidence rate ratios 
and the standard errors have been clustered at the regional DSA managed by each of the OPOs. Panel A: 
parameter estimates for Equation 1. Panel B: parameter estimates for Equation 2. Panel C: parameter estimates 
for Equation 3. Panel D: parameter estimates for Equation 4. ***indicates statistically significant at the 1% level, 
**indicates statistically significant at the 5% level and *indicates statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 




  Panel A  
 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
,it enrolledNLDAC  
1.0430 1.0770 1.0340 1.9326*** 
 (0.068) (0.078) (0.109) (0.489) 
  Controls   
Center FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo 2R  0.4112    
 Panel B  
 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
,( )it enrolledNLDAC  
1.0391 1.1230** 1.1052 1.5829*** 
,( )it filedNLDAC×  
(0.058) (0.130) (0.097) (0.296) 
 Controls  
Center FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Pseudo 2R  0.4116    
 Panel C  
 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
,( )it enrolledNLDAC  
1.0549 1.1661** 1.2638*** 1.5576*** 
× ,( )it activeNLDAC  (0.049) (0.086) (0.100) (0.198) 
 Controls  
Center FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo 2R  0.4118    
 Panel D  
 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
,( )it enrolledNLDAC  
1.1042 1.0739 1.4033*** 1.3565** 
,( )it filedNLDAC×  
(0.078) (0.70) (0.138) (0.201) 
,( )it activeNLDAC×      




 Controls  
Center FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo 2R  0.4120    
Table 7: Regression Results: Left column represents the estimated treatment effect on living donor kidney 
transplants. Right column illustrates the treatment effect on deceased donor kidney transplants. All regressions 
contain the same covariate controls used in our estimation of the NLDAC treatment effects. All coefficients are 
expressed as incidence rate ratios and the standard errors have been clustered at the regional DSA managed by 
each of the OPOs.***indicates statistically significant at the 1% level, **indicates statistically significant at the 5% 
level and *indicates statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
CMS Total Graft Survival Model 
Variable Liv. Kidney Dec. 
Kidney 
Liv. Kidney Dec. 
Kidney 
Liv. Kidney Dec. 
Kidney 
Liv. Kidney Dec. 
Kidney 
,it enrolledNLDAC  
1.2180*** 1.1289 1.1781*** 1.1262 1.1805*** 1.1284 1.1801*** 1.1261 
 (0.070) (0.111) (0.067) (0.108) (0.067) (0.109) (0.066) (0.108) 
,( )it enrolledNLDAC    
1.1349** 1.0072   1.0028 1.0109 




× ,( )it filedNLDAC    (0.071) (0.036)   (0.068) (0.047) 
,( )it enrolledNLDAC      
1.1456*** 1.0015   
,( it activeNLDAC×      
(0.054) (0.027)   
,( )it enrolledNLDAC        
1.1437*** 0.9958 
,( )it filedNLDAC×  
      (0.055) (0.036) 
,( )it activeNLDAC×          
Controls 
Center FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo 2R  0.4109 0.3941 0.4111 0.3941 0.4114 0.3941 0.4114 0.3941 
Num. of Obs. 26,769 26,769 26,769 26,769 26,769 26,769 26,769 26,769 
CMS Total Patient Survival Model 
Variable Liv. Kidney Dec. 
Kidney 
Liv. Kidney Dec. 
Kidney 
Liv. Kidney Dec. 
Kidney 
Liv. Kidney Dec. 
Kidney 
,it enrolledNLDAC  
1.2216*** 1.1319 1.1835*** 1.1273 1.1815*** 1.1318 1.1815*** 1.1270 




 (0.070) (0.115) (0.067) (0.111) (0.065) (0.113) (0.065) (0.111) 
,( )it enrolledNLDAC    
1.1416** 1.0125   1.0135 1.0230 
,( it filedNLDAC×  
  (0.070) (0.034)   (0.067) (0.048) 
,( )it enrolledNLDAC      
1.1472*** 1.0003   
× ,( )it activeNLDAC      (0.032) (0.027)   
,( )it enrolledNLDAC        
1.1379*** 0.9884 
,( )it filedNLDAC×  
      (0.054) (0.037) 
,( )it activeNLDAC×          
Controls 
Center FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo 2R  0.4109 0.3938 0.4114 0.3938 0.4114 0.3938 0.4114 0.3938 
Num. of Obs. 26,769 26,769 26,769 26,769 26,769 26,769 26,769 26,769 
Table 8: Regression Results: Left column represents the estimated treatment effect on living donor kidney 
transplants for those centers that conducted both living donor kidney transplants and thoracic transplants (119 




centers). Right column illustrates the treatment effect on thoracic transplants (129 centers). All coefficients are 
expressed as incidence rate ratios and the standard errors have been clustered at the regional DSA managed by 
each of the OPOs.***indicates statistically significant at the 1% level, **indicates statistically significant at the 5% 
level and *indicates statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
CMS Total Graft Survival Model 
Variable Liv. Kidney Thoracic Liv. Kidney Thoracic Liv. Kidney Thoracic Liv. Kidney Thoracic 
,it enrolledNLDAC  
0.9610 0.9680 0.9509 0.9965 0.9436 0.9988 0.9491 0.9955 
 (0.058) (0.186) (0.057) (0.188) (0.058) (0.197) (0.057) (0.187) 
,( )it enrolledNLDAC    
1.1084 0.9479   0.8979 1.0110 
,( it filedNLDAC×  
  (0.068) (0.047)   (0.071) (0.102) 
,( )it enrolledNLDAC      
1.1462*** 0.9358   
× ,( )it activeNLDAC      (0.055) (0.050)   
,( )it enrolledNLDAC        
1.2211*** 0.9307 
,( )it filedNLDAC×  
      (0.074) (0.085) 
,( )it activeNLDAC×          





Center FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo 2R  0.3583 0.4471 0.3584 0.4471 0.3588 0.4472 0.3589 0.4472 
Num. of Obs. 13,937 15,480 13,937 15,480 13,937 15,480 13,937 15,480 
CMS Total Patient Survival Model 
Variable Liv. 
Kidney 
Thoracic Liv. Kidney Thoracic Liv. Kidney Thoracic Liv. Kidney Thoracic 
,it enrolledNLDAC  
0.9676 0.9685 0.9561 0.9975 0.9499 0.9991 0.9547 0.9967 
 (0.057) (0.186) (0.056) (0.189) (0.057) (0.197) (0.056) (0.188) 
,( )it enrolledNLDAC    
1.0929 0.9471   0.9142 1.0081 
,( )it filedNLDAC×    (0.069) (0.047)   (0.072) (0.098) 
,( )it enrolledNLDAC      
1.1470*** 0.9363   
× ,( )it activeNLDAC      (0.056) (0.049)   
,( )it enrolledNLDAC        
1.2091*** 0.9325 




,( )it filedNLDAC×  
      (0.073) (0.082) 
,( )it activeNLDAC×          
Controls 
Center FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mnth/Yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo 2R  0.3582 0.4470 0.3583 0.4471 0.3587 0.4472 0.3588 0.4472 
Num. of Obs. 13,937 15,480 13,937 15,480 13,937 15,480 13,937 15,480 
Figure 1: The number of living and deceased kidney donors and transplants from 1988-2012 (OPTN 2014). The 
number of deceased donors is the solid line and the number of living donors is the dashed line. The top panel 
contains the number of donors and the bottom panel contains the number of transplants conducted from the 
donor sources. 
Figure 2: Participation in NLDAC by Year. Enrolled in NLDAC corresponds with our treatment variable 
,it enrolledNLDAC . Enrolled and Filed at least once with NLDAC corresponds with our treatment variable 
,it filedNLDAC . Enrolled and actively filing corresponds with our treatment variable ,it activeNLDAC . 
Figure 3: Plot of the average residuals for those centers that enrolled in NLDAC and those that did not enroll. The 
residuals were obtained by regressing our monthly number of organ transplants on a set of transplant-center fixed 
effects to de-mean the data. The top panel plots the average monthly residuals and the bottom panel aggregates 
up to the year. 




Figure 4: Plot of the average residuals for those centers that enrolled in NLDAC and filed a claim with them at 
some point in time post-NLDAC (this is a time invariant group, any center filing in the post-NLDAC period is 
included) and those that enrolled in NLDAC but never elected to file a claim for reimbursement from NLDAC. The 
residuals were obtained by regressing our monthly number of organ transplants on a set of transplant-center fixed 
effects to de-mean the data. The top panel plots the average monthly residuals and the bottom panel aggregates 
up to the year. 
Figure 5: Plot of the average residuals for those centers that enrolled in NLDAC and filed a claim with them at 
some time post-NLDAC and those that enrolled in NLDAC but never elected to file a claim for reimbursement from 
NLDAC. In the post-NLDAC time period those centers that enrolled and filed a claim with NLDAC are further 
divided into those centers that filed in the given year and those did not in the same year. The residuals were 
obtained by regressing our monthly number of organ transplants on a set of transplant-center fixed effects to 
de-mean the data. The top panel plots the average monthly residuals and the bottom panel aggregates up to the 
year. 
Figure 6: Plot of the monthly treatment variables. The top panel contains results for the monthly treatment 
variables obtained from estimating Equation 1. The bottom panel contains results for the monthly treatment 
variables obtained from estimating Equation 2. The time period varies from t-12 to t+12 months from the first 
month either a center enrolled in NLDAC (top panel) or the first month they filed a reimbursement claim with 
NLDAC (bottom panel). 
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